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Abstract
Compendious and thorough solutions to the existence of a linear price equilibrium
problem, the second welfare theorem, and the limit theorem on the core are provided
for exchange economies whose consumption sets are the positive cone of arbitrary
ordered Fre´chet spaces—dispensing entirely with the assumption that the vector
ordering of the commodity space is a lattice. The motivation comes from economic
applications showing the need to bring within the scope of equilibrium theory vector
orderings that are not lattices, which arise in the typical model of portfolio trading
with missing options. The assumptions are on the primitives of the model and for
ω-proper economies they are both sufficient and necessary.
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1 Introduction
The second half of the twentieth century saw an explosion of interest in the Wal-
rasian model of general equilibrium. Of the many fundamental results that have
been established three are foundational: the existence of at least one competitive
equilibrium, the characterization of valuation equilibria as efficient allocations, and
the characterization of competitive equilibria as Edgeworth equilibria.
These important results provide conceptual foundations for our understanding of ef-
ficiency and welfare economics. Moreover, all applied economic policy analysis relies
implicitly on the foundations provided by general equilibrium theory. Unfortunately,
at present general equilibrium theory does not provide an adequate understanding
of economies in many settings. As a consequence, policy analysis in many important
areas (e.g., financial markets) rests on shaky foundations.
For several decades a primary research program in general equilibrium theory has
been to establish the classical theorems on price decentralization and the price equi-
librium existence problem in a context sufficiently general to encompass as particular
instances the important general equilibrium models which arise in applications. This
program was well articulated by Mas-Colell [29]. The idea is to separate the very
difficult mathematical problems associated with price decentralization from their
applications.
The principal contributors to this program are, of course, Mas-Colell [29] and Mas-
Colell and Richard [30]. In those papers the authors replace the pervasive finite
dimensional assumption on the interiority of endowments in consumption sets with
two requirements:
(1) The commodity space be ordered by a vector lattice ordering that is “com-
patible” with the topology of the space and that constrains and motivates
traders—the traders’ consumption sets coincide with the positive cone of this
ordering and preferences are monotone with respect to this ordering.
(2) That preferences satisfy an assumption termed ω-uniform properness (where ω
is the total endowment of resources), which is a cone condition that could in
some settings be interpreted as a bound on the marginal rates of substitution
(see for instance [34,17,12,39]).
The work of Mas-Colell [29] was extended in [3,4,15,16,40,41] and the work of Mas-
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Colell and Richard [30] was extended in [20,22,32,33,37,38]. In all these papers some
variant of ω-properness is assumed and the lattice theoretic arguments are used
in a non-trivial way. However, the use of lattice theoretic techniques comes at a
price: the very structure of the economy is expressed in terms of the vector lattice
ordering of the commodity space. For instance, the constraints on consumption sets,
the notion of monotone preferences, the properness assumptions, free disposal, the
notion of a free disposal equilibrium, the topology of the commodity space, and
even the compactness assumptions on the set of feasible allocations are all defined
with respect to the vector lattice ordering of the commodity space. Therefore, the
economic meaning of these results hinges on the the interpretive efficacy of the
ordering of the space.
Commodity spaces that are not lattice ordered arise naturally in many economic
models and the large literature on price decentralization in vector lattices has little,
that is obvious, to say in such a setting. An example of such an economic model is
portfolio trading when markets are incomplete. It is known that in such models all
the decentralization results can fail even if the preferences are uniformly proper and
the commodity space is finite dimensional. In these models consumers are motivated
by the payoff of a portfolio. Therefore, the meaningful natural ordering of the port-
folio space is the one that compares portfolio payoffs and which is closely related
to the notion of first order stochastic domination. In fact, the notion of arbitrage
free prices is an order theoretic notion that induces this natural ordering of the
portfolio space. Unfortunately, this ordering is rarely a vector lattice ordering when
markets are not complete. The basic intuition for this is the following. Generally,
when markets are not complete some call and put options cannot be replicated as
the payoff of a portfolio of available securities. However, call and put options are
closely related to the order structure of the portfolio space. Indeed, every marketed
option is a lattice operation in the portfolio space and every lattice operation in the
portfolio space is related to what is termed in the finance literature a minimum-cost
super replicating portfolio of a call or put option (which need not exist).
Can we extend the existing results on price decentralization and the price equilibrium
existence problem to ordered commodity spaces that are not vector lattices? We have
the following four pointers:
(a) It is known that when the commodity space is an Archimedean ordered vector
lattice the price decentralization results hold true but with possibly discon-
tinuous prices. Jones [25] and Aliprantis and Burkinshaw [8] show that if the
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commodity space is a vector lattice, then to ensure that the decentralizing
prices are continuous we need some lattice structure on the space of continuous
prices.
(b) In the very general context where the commodity space is an ordered vector
space that need not be a vector lattice, Aliprantis–Tourky–Yannelis [13] intro-
duced an alternate value theory that arises from a personalized pricing system
which induces a possibly non-linear value function. The classical price decen-
tralization problems are solved by means of these non-linear value functions.
(c) Aliprantis–Monteiro–Tourky [9] give an example of a uniformly proper model
of portfolio trading, with three securities and two traders (i.e., with a three
dimensional commodity space), whose portfolio space is not lattice ordered and
in which all the decentralization theorems fail for linear prices. In that example,
optimal allocations can be supported by the Aliprantis–Tourky–Yannelis non-
linear prices.
(d) Aliprantis and Tourky [10] show that the dual cone of every ordered topological
vector space can be embedded in a larger lattice ordered cone that contains non-
linear functionals, which they term the super order dual of the ordered vector
space. Crucially, this embedding preserves lattice operations. By means of this
embedding, they show that many of the useful structures of vector lattices
have analogues in general ordered vector space settings. That is, ordered vector
spaces are basically not so different from vector lattices.
Our purpose in this paper is to provide a thorough solution to the (linear) price
decentralization and equilibrium existence problems in commodity spaces that are
ordered Fre´chet spaces, which includes the important class of ordered Banach spaces.
The paper affords both necessary and sufficient conditions for linear price decentral-
ization.
We deal with well behaved exchange economies that we call ω-proper economies,
which include the class of ω-uniformly proper economies. We show that the linear
decentralization of Pareto optimal allocations and Edgeworth equilibria as well as the
existence of a linear price equilibrium are all basically equivalent to the properness
of functionals in the super-order dual of the commodity space. More precisely, we
consider the embedding of the dual cone of the commodity space in the in the super
order dual, which is a lattice. Then we denote by P the semi-lattice generated by the
cone of positive linear prices and call P our price space. Each possibly non-linear
price p in P can be written as the supremum p =
∨m
i=1 fi, where f1, . . . , fm are
positive linear prices. Now each function p in P is a concave function defined on the
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positive cone of the commodity space. Therefore, the standard properness notions
can be defined for these functions like any utility function. Surprisingly, it turns out
that if each price in P satisfies a properness assumption, then the following hold
true.
(1) The second welfare theorem holds, i.e., Pareto optimal allocations can be de-
centralized as (linear) Walrasian valuation equilibria.
(2) The limit theorem on the core holds, i.e., Edgeworth equilibria are (linear)
Walrasian equilibria.
(3) With the standard compactness assumptions, there exists a (linear) Walrasian
equilibrium.
The second major set of results of the paper shows that these same properness
assumptions on the price space P are also necessary conditions for linear decentral-
ization and the existence of equilibria.
The linear price decentralization theorems enumerated above afford positive results
in a host of infinite dimensional settings that are not vector lattice ordered. We note
that the ω-properness of prices in P depends on the order structure of the commodity
space and the “location” of the total endowment of resources. Furthermore, it is
relatively easy to check if a price p =
∨m
i=1 fi satisfies our properness assumption.
Indeed, in a large class of settings properness is equivalent to the existence of a
solution to the following convex programming problem:
min g(ω) subject to : g is linear and g ≥ f1, . . . , fm .
In the finance framework this minimization problem translates into the following
linear minimization problem:
min g
(
T (ω)
)
subject to: T ′(g) ≥ fi for all i = 1, . . . ,m ,
where each fi is an arbitrage free securities price, T is a portfolio returns operator
that associates with each portfolio a state contingent claim, and T ′ is the adjoint
of T that associates with each Arrow–Debreu price a securities price. This second
minimization problem is a variant of the canonical linear minimization problem
and is the subject of much investigation in the mathematical literature on linear
programming and operations research.
The main surprise of the analysis in the present paper is that the theory of value
with linear prices can be articulated in terms of the cone conditions ubiquitously
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called properness in the economics literature. That is, the main contribution in
the literature that follows the work of Mas-Colell [29] is the application of cone
conditions to the primitive data of the economy rather than the application of lattice
theoretic ideas to general equilibrium analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the study in the paper by
introducing an abstract framework of portfolio trading with incomplete markets.
Our analysis begins in Section 3. The main results of the paper are contained in
Sections 4 and 5. We return to financial models in the last section of the paper and
apply our results.
2 A Motivating Framework
The purpose of this section is to introduce a very general securities model that
includes as special cases many of the securities models studied in the literature. Our
approach will be an operator theoretic study that is closely related to the setup of
R. A. Jarrow, X. Jin, and D. B. Madan [24] and V. Galvani [23]. For a study of
positive operators see the monographs [1,7]. We refer the reader to the next section
of this paper for definitions concerning ordered vector spaces.
Let us summarize the basic framework. In a typical finance model one begins with a
pair of function spaces L and X, where L is the portfolio space and X is the space
of all contingent claims, together with a portfolio returns operator R : L→ X
that satisfies the following two properties.
R1: There are no redundant securities (that is, R is one-to-one) and R is positive.
R2: The operator R pulls back order intervals of R(L) to closed and bounded subsets
of L.
The operator R : L → X reorders the portfolio space L according to the ordering
of X. This new ordering of the portfolio space is called the portfolio dominance or-
dering (a notion introduced in [5]), which in general is not a vector lattice ordering
even if X is a vector lattice. Portfolio traders are motivated and constrained by this
new ordering rather than the canonical ordering of L, which is basically redundant.
Crucially, the arbitrage freeness of securities prices is relative to this new generally
non-lattice portfolio dominance ordering. Some important examples of portfolio re-
turns operators are provided by embeddings R : L ↪→ X. That is, when R(L) is
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closed or, equivalently, when R is bounded below, i.e., there exists some constant
c > 0 such that ‖Rθ‖ ≥ c‖θ‖ holds for all θ ∈ L; see [1, Theorem 2.5].
In a two period model the Banach lattice X could be for instance one of the follow-
ing:
(a) The Banach lattice X = L2(S,Σ, pi) of all square integrable functions on S,
where (S,Σ, pi) is a probability space representing period one uncertainty.
(b) Given a compact topological space S representing the states of the world to-
morrow, the Banach lattice X = C(S) of all continuous functions on S.
(c) Any of the Banach lattice commodity spaces from the existing literature.
In a continuous time model, we are given a probability space (S,Σ, pi) and an interval
T ⊆ R+ such that the space X is the space of all stochastic processes of the form
f(t, s), which are square integrable functions from T to L2(S,Σ, pi).
Two examples in the finance literature of portfolio spaces are as follows.
(a) In a two-period model the available securities are indexed by a positive σ-
finite measure space (J ,F , µ). The portfolio space is the Banach space L =
L2(J ,F , µ). A portfolio is any vector in the portfolio space L.
(b) In a continuous time model where T is a subinterval of R, the space of portfolios
is the space of portfolio processes from T to L2(J ,F , µ). For more on portfolio
processes we refer the reader to [26].
Two important examples of assets returns operators are presented next.
(1) When there are finitely many states of the world and finitely many available
securities the assets returns operator R is simply a non-negative matrix whose
columns delineate the available non-redundant assets. For more on this example
see for instance [28] and [35].
(2) In the case the portfolio space is the Banach function space L = L2(J ,F , µ) =
L2(J ) and the space of contingent claims is X = L2(S,Σ, pi) = L2(S), R is an
integral operator. Here, the payoff of a security j at state s is denoted P (j, s).
The function P : J × S → R+ is called the assets returns kernel, which is
assumed to be µ× pi-measurable. We assume that for each portfolio θ ∈ L the
function j 7→ P (j, s)θ(j) is µ-integrable for pi-almost all s ∈ S. Moreover, the
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payoff [Rθ](s) of a portfolio θ for pi-almost all states of the world s is given by
[Rθ](s) =
∫
J
P (j, s)θ(j)dµ(j) .
We assume that the range of the operator R lies in L2(S). Therefore, R defines
an integral linear operator from the portfolio space L2(J ) to the contingent
claims space L2(S). In this case, notice that this operator is positive if and
only if the assets returns kernel is non-negative.
In (2) above it is not always true that the portfolio returns operator R pulls back
order intervals of R(L) to closed and bounded subsets of L. However, an example
of a portfolio returns operator that pulls back order intervals of R(L) to closed and
bounded subsets of L will be presented in Section 6.
Let us formalize the general framework. We are given a Banach lattice X that
represents the space of all real (possibly multiperiod) contingent claims. A vector in
X is called a contingent claim. The positive cone of this space is X+ and, as usual,
a consumer’s consumption decision is restricted to this cone. Agents trade portfolios
of available securities that pay contingent claims in X. They choose a portfolio
which is a vector in a given Banach lattice L called the portfolio space. The payoffs
of portfolios are given by means of the portfolio returns operator R : L → X. So,
the payoff of a portfolio θ ∈ L is R(θ) ∈ X or simply Rθ.
A contingent claim x ∈ X is said to be marketed if there exists a portfolio θ ∈ L
such that Rθ = x. The vector subspace of all marketed contingent claims is denoted
M, and clearly, M = R(L), the range of R. We say that the market is complete
if M = X, where M denotes the closure of M. If M 6= X, then the market is
incomplete.
The portfolio returns operator induces a new ordering ≥ on the portfolio space L
as follows:
θ ≥ η ⇐⇒ Rθ ≥ Rη .
This ordering is termed portfolio dominance. Denote the positive cone of this
ordering of the portfolio space by L+ = {θ ∈ L : Rθ ≥ 0}, which is in general
different from the canonical positive cone of the portfolio space L.
From now on when we talk about the ordering of the portfolio space we are referring
to the portfolio dominance ordering.
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The portfolio space under this ordering fits perfectly into the analysis in the sequel.
Lemma 1 Under portfolio dominance the portfolio space is an ordered Banach space
with a generating positive cone and bounded order intervals. If L is reflexive or ifM
is closed and X has an order continuous norm, then order intervals in the portfolio
space are weakly compact.
proof. Notice first that the portfolio cone is generating since it contains the original
positive cone of L, which is generating. Moreover, L+ = R
−1(X+) is closed.
If L is reflexive, then the dominance order intervals of L are closed and bounded
by assumption, and hence they are weakly compact. When M is closed, then by
the open mapping theorem the operator R : L → M is a topological and order
isomorphism. Moreover, since X has order continuous norm the order intervals of
X are weakly compact and so are the order intervals of M. By the continuity of
R−1 : M→ L it follows that the dominance order intervals of L are likewise weakly
compact.
Notice that commodity spaces that are Banach lattices with order continuous norms
are ubiquitous in modern general equilibrium analysis.
Clearly, if M = X, then portfolio dominance is a vector lattice ordering. This is
so since the portfolio returns operator is surjective and therefore it reorders the
portfolio space in a vector lattice manner. However, if the market is incomplete,
then portfolio dominance is unlikely to be a vector lattice ordering. In fact, one
can characterize the very rare situations in which this ordering is a vector lattice
ordering.
For any set Y in the space of contingent claims let R(Y ) be the Riesz subspace of
X generated by Y , i.e., R(Y ) is the smallest Riesz subspace containing Y .
Lemma 2 Portfolio dominance is a vector lattice ordering if and only if there exists
a positive projection from R(M) to R(M) whose range is the marketed space M.
proof. Clearly, portfolio dominance is a vector lattice ordering if and only ifM is a
Riesz space under its canonical ordering as a subspace of X. But by Miyajima’s re-
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sult [1, Theorem 5.64] this is the case if and only if there exists a positive projection 1
from R(M) to R(M).
The lattice operations in the portfolio space are closely related to the presence of
marketed call options. Recall, that a contingent claim x ∈ X is called marketed
if there exists a portfolio θ ∈ L satisfying Rθ = x. Now take a portfolio θ and
a strike price k ∈ X. Assume that k is marketed and let κ ∈ L satisfy Rκ = k.
The call option on the portfolio θ with strike price k is the contingent claim
[Rθ− k]+ = (Rθ− k)∨ 0 ∈ X. The call option is non-trivial if neither Rθ ≥ k nor
Rθ ≤ k hold. If such an option is marketed, then the supremum [θ−κ]+ = (θ−κ)∨0
exists in L for the portfolio dominance ordering and R[θ − κ]+ = [Rθ − k]+.
In other words, a call option is a vector lattice operation in X and if it is marketed,
then it is replicated by a vector lattice operation in L. So, the marketability of call
options transfers the lattice structure of X to L. However, we know the following
results from the finite dimensional setting.
Lemma 3 Suppose that there are J finitely many nominal securities and S finitely
many states of the world. Let Φ be the space of all assets returns matrices for which
the bond 1 is marketed. The following results hold true:
(1) Generically in Φ the market is complete if and only if all call options are mar-
keted.
(2) If J ≤ 1
2
(S + 1), then generically in Φ no non-trivial call option is marketed.
proof. For (1) see [35] and for (2) see [11].
Finally for this section, let us define the notion of arbitrage free securities prices.
A securities price is simply a continuous linear functional on the portfolio space.
Therefore, the dual space L′ is called the space of securities prices. A securities
price p is weakly arbitrage free if for any portfolio θ ∈ L+ (i.e., Rθ ∈ X+) we
have p(θ) ≥ 0. A securities price p is arbitrage free if for any non-zero portfolio
1 An operator T : V → V on a vector space is called a projection if T 2 = T . If V is
an ordered vector space a projection that is also a positive operator is called a positive
projection.
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θ ∈ L+ \ {0} we have p(θ) > 0. Therefore, arbitrage freeness is defined in terms of
the portfolio dominance ordering of L.
In fact, portfolio dominance induces an ordering on the space of securities prices as
follows: p ≥ q if p(θ) ≥ q(θ) for all θ ∈ L+. This ordering is a vector ordering that
makes L′ an ordered Banach space. As usual denote by L′+ the positive cone of L
′.
That is, L′+ = {f ∈ L
′ : f ≥ 0}.
Lemma 4 A securities price p is weakly arbitrage free if and only if p ∈ L′+. It is
arbitrage free if and only if it is a strictly positive linear functional (i.e., pÀ 0).
3 The General Equilibrium Model
In this section we introduce the commodity space, the price space, proper economies,
and the various notions of equilibria. For technical details not covered in this paper,
we refer the reader to the following monographs. For general infinite dimensional
analysis see [2]. For the theory of ordered topological vector spaces see [31,36]. For
vector lattices see [6,27]. We shall extensively use results obtained in [10] regarding
the super order dual of an ordered vector space.
The Commodity Space is an ordered Fre´chet space L with a closed and generating
positive cone whose order intervals are topologically bounded. That is:
(a) L is a topological vector space endowed with a complete metrizable locally
convex topology τ .
(b) L is equipped with an order relation ≥ such that x≥y imply αx + z≥αy + z
for all z∈L and all scalars α≥0.
(c) The positive cone L+ = {x ∈ L : x ≥ 0} is closed and generating, i.e.,
L+−L+=L.
(d) Each order interval [0, x] = {y ∈ L+ : 0 ≤ y ≤ x} is τ -bounded.
The topological dual of (L, τ) is denoted L′. It is also an ordered vector space
under its canonical ordering, i.e., f ≥ g if f(x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ L+. We shall require
that at least one of Mas-Colell’s [29] quasi-concave uniformly proper functions that
is also strictly monotone exists, or equivalently:
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• There exists a strictly positive linear functional f ∈ L′, i.e., f(x) > 0 for all
x > 0.
The dual of our commodity space is well behaved.
Lemma 5 Every positive linear functional is continuous and the cone L′+ is gener-
ating. 2
If the least upper bound (supremum) (resp. the greatest lower bound (in-
fimum)) of a subset S of an ordered space exists, then it may be denoted supS or∨m
i=1 xi when S = {x1, . . . , xm} or x ∨ y when S = {x, y} (resp. inf S or
∧m
i=1 xi or
x∧y). As usual, we shall say that L is a Riesz space (or a vector lattice) if x∨y
and x ∧ y exist in L for all x, y∈L.
The Price Space will be a semi-lattice of the super order dual of L+. We begin
with a few definitions. We say that a function f : L+ → R is positive if f(x) ≥ 0
holds for each x ∈ L+; is super-additive, if f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x + y) holds for
all x, y ∈ L+; additive if f(x + y) = f(x) + f(y) holds for all x, y ∈ L+; and
is positively homogeneous, if f(αx) = αf(x) holds for every α ≥ 0 and all
x ∈ L+.
The price space will be a subset of the following collection of real-valued non-negative
functions on L+ given by
Π =
{
f ∈ R
L+
+ : f is super-additive and positively homogeneous
}
.
It should be noticed that every function f ∈ Π is monotone in the sense that
0 ≤ x ≤ y implies 0 = f(0) ≤ f(x) ≤ f(y). Clearly, Π is a cone of RL+ . The cone
Π is called the super order dual cone of L+ and was introduced and studied in
detail in [10]. Notice that Π inherits the natural pointwise order of RL+ . In other
words, for f, g : L+ → R we write f ≥ g (and say that f dominates g) whenever
f(x) ≥ g(x) holds for each x ∈ L+.
The important result for us here is that the cone Π is a lattice even though L may
2 From [10, Theorem 7.2] we know that L′ = Lr = L∼ where Lr is the order regular
dual of L comprising of linear functionals that can be written as differences of positive
linear functionals and L∼ is the order dual of L consisting of all order bounded linear
functionals on L.
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not be a vector lattice; see [10, Corollary 4.4].
Theorem 6 The super order dual cone Π with its natural ordering is a lattice.
Moreover, the supremum operation for any pair f1, f2 ∈ Π and any x ∈ L+ is given
by [
f1 ∨ f2
]
(x) = sup
{
f1(y1) + f2(y2) : y1, y2 ∈ L+ and y1 + y2 = x
}
.
The dual cone L′+ can be viewed as a subcone of the cone Π. In particular, throughout
our discussion we shall use the following simple but very useful result, whose proof
follows from the Kantorovich extension theorem; see for instance [1, Theorem 1.15].
Lemma 7 The positive linear functionals on L are precisely the extensions of the
additive functions in Π. So, we can write L′+ =
{
f ∈ Π: f is additive
}
.
As a matter of fact, there is a natural embedding J : L′+ → Π defined by
J(f)(x) = f(x)
for all x ∈ L+. This embedding is clearly one-to-one and monotone. In addition, we
have the following remarkable result proved in [10, Theorem 5.5].
Theorem 8 (Aliprantis–Tourky) Assume that the order intervals of L are weakly
compact. If the supremum
∨n
i=1 fi of the positive continuous linear functionals f1, . . . , fn
on L exists in L′, then
J
( n∨
i=1
fi
)
=
n∨
i=1
J(fi)
holds in Π. That is, the embedding J : L′+ → Π preserves finite suprema.
Let us say that a non-empty subset of a lattice is a semi-lattice if it is closed under
finite suprema. Every non-empty subset A of a lattice is included in a smallest semi-
lattice U(A), called the semi-lattice generated by A. Clearly, U(A) consists of
all finite suprema of the set A. With this definition in mind, we are now ready to
define our price space.
Definition 9 The price space P is the semi-lattice U(L′+), i.e., P consists of all
finite suprema of L′+ in the super dual cone Π.
The pair 〈L,P〉 will be our commodity-price duality. In the special case of a
Riesz commodity space, i.e., when L is a Fre´chet lattice, the price space P coincides
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with the positive cone of L′ and we regain the standard commodity-price duality in
the literature. We have the following result concerning the price space P .
Lemma 10 If P = L′+, then L
′ is a Riesz space. Conversely, P = L′+ whenever
one of the following conditions holds true:
(1) L is a Riesz space.
(2) L has the Riesz decomposition property, i.e., [0, x] + [0, y] = [0, x+ y] holds for
all x, y ∈ L+.
(3) L is a Banach space and L′ is a Riesz space in its own right.
(4) The order intervals of L are weakly compact and L′ is a Riesz space in its own
right. 3
proof. First suppose that P = L′+. Fix f ∈ L
′. Since L′ = Lr holds, it follows that
there exists some g ∈ L′+ satisfying −g ≤ f . By our assumption (f+g)∨g = g+f∨0
exits in P = L′+. This implies that f ∨ 0 exists in L
′. Therefore L′ is a Riesz space.
The proofs of (1)–(4) follow from the fact that in those settings for any f1, f2 ∈ L
′
+
and for any x ∈ L+ the supremum is given by the Riesz–Kantorovich formula:
[
f1 ∨ f2
]
(x)= sup
{
f1(y1) + f2(y2) : y1, y2 ∈ L+ and y1 + y2 = x
}
,
in both L′ and in Π. See [14] for (3) and [10] for (4).
Each price in P can be written as the supremum
∨n
i=1 fi of linear functions f1, . . . , fn
in L′+. So, from now on,
∨n
i=1 fi shall be understood to be the price in P which is
the supremum of the linear functions f1, . . . , fn ∈ L
′
+.
Perhaps we can appreciate why in general the suprema in P are not additive by
looking at the special case of a three dimensional commodity space. The half-ray
of the cone L+ determined by a vector x ∈ L+ is the set Lx = {αx : α ≥ 0}. A
3 We note that every Riesz space has the Riesz decomposition property, but not every
space that has the Riesz decomposition property is a Riesz space. The following is a open
question in the mathematical literature: Does there exist an ordered vector space that does
not have the Riesz decomposition property and whose regular dual Lr is a vector lattice?
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half-ray Lx of L+ is called an extremal ray of the cone L+ if for each y∈Lx we
have [0, y] = {δy : 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1}. The following result is easy to prove; see [10].
Lemma 11 Let L be a three dimensional vector space. There exist at least one pair
of non-comparable linear functionals f, g ∈ L′+ such that the function f ∨ g ∈ P is
additive if and only if L+ has at most four extremal rays.
Domination in P is characterized as follows; for a proof see [10, Lemma 3.7].
Lemma 12 (Aliprantis–Tourky) Assume that f, g ∈ P. If f(x0) > 0 holds for
some x0 ∈ L+, then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) The function g dominates f , i.e., g(y) ≥ f(y) holds for each y ∈ L+.
(2) For each y ∈ L+ satisfying f(y) = f(x0) we have g(y) ≥ f(x0).
The Economy has m consumers designated by the index i = 1, . . . ,m. As usual,
the consumption set of consumer i is L+. The bundle ωi > 0 is the ith consumer’s
initial endowment and ω =
∑m
i=1 ωi is the total endowment.
The correspondence Pi : L+→→L+ denotes the ith consumer’s (strict) preferences.
We assume that each mapping Pi satisfies the standard assumptions. That is, Pi is
irreflexive, i.e., x /∈ Pi(x) for each x ∈ L+; is strictly monotone, i.e., x + y ∈
Pi(x) for each y > 0; is convex-valued; has open values in L+ for some linear
topology on L; and is ω-proper in the sense of Tourky [37]:
• There exists another convex-valued correspondence P̂i : L+→→L such that for
each x ∈ L+:
(a) The vector x+ ω is an interior point of P̂i(x).
(b) P̂i(x) ∩ L+ = Pi(x).
An exchange economy with commodity-price duality 〈L,P〉 and with the above
characteristics will be referred to as a proper economy. We will say that the
economy is compact if order intervals of L are weakly compact and preferences
have weakly open lower sections, that is, for each bundle y ∈ L+ the lower
section P−1i (y) =
{
x ∈ L+ : y ∈ Pi(x)
}
is weakly open in L+.
For any x ∈ L+ let Ax = {y ∈ L
m
+ :
∑m
i=1 yi = x}. As usually, (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Aω
is said to be an allocation. In our general setting, we say that endowments are
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decomposable if
Aω1 + Aω2 + · · ·+ Aωm = Aω .
This is a very natural assumption in economics. It means that each allocation can
be viewed as the outcome of bilateral trading. Notice that in the presence of the
Riesz decomposition property this condition is always true. However, this equality
can be true for some choices of initial endowments in any ordered vector space.
Definition 13 For a given commodity space L and any fixed ω > 0, we shall denote
the collection of all proper economies with commodity-price duality 〈L,P〉 and total
endowment ω by E(L, ω). The collection of economies in E(L, ω) for which the
endowments are decomposable will be denoted ED(L, ω).
The next result informs us that we are not working with an empty set of economies.
Lemma 14 For any commodity space L and any fixed ω > 0 the collection of all
decomposable economies ED(L, ω) ⊆ E(L, ω) is non-empty and contains economies
with arbitrarily many consumers. Further, if L has the Riesz decomposition property,
then E(L, ω) = ED(L, ω).
proof. To see that ED(L, ω) is non-empty, let ωi =
1
m
ω and assume that every
consumer i has the utility function ui(x) = f(x), where f ∈ L
′ is a strictly positive
linear functional.
Let us introduce the standard notions of efficiency. An allocation (x1, . . . , xm) is
said to be weakly Pareto optimal, if there is no allocation (y1, . . . , ym) satisfying
yi ∈ P (xi) for each i ∈ I; a core allocation, if it cannot be blocked by any
allocation in the sense that there is no allocation (y1, . . . , ym) and a coalition S such
that
(a)
∑
i∈S yi =
∑
i∈S ωi, and
(b) yi ∈ Pi(xi) for all i ∈ S;
an Edgeworth equilibrium, if it belongs to the core of every r-fold replica econ-
omy. 4
4 The notion of Edgeworth equilibrium was introduced in [3] and was inspired by the
notion of the strict core of G. Debreu and H. E. Scarf [19]. It was shown in [21] that
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A Price Equilibrium in this paper is the generalization in [13] of the standard
notion of Walrasian equilibrium to the case of the extended commodity price duality
〈L,P〉.
Definition 15 An allocation (x1, . . . , xm) is said to be:
(1) A valuation equilibrium, if there exists some price p ∈ P (called a sup-
porting price) such that:
(a) y ∈ Pi(xi) implies p(y) > p(xi), and
(b) the arbitrage–free condition 0 < p(ω) ≤
∑m
i=1 p(xi) holds.
(2) An equilibrium, if there exists some some price p ∈ P (again called a sup-
porting price) such that:
(a) p(ω) > 0,
(b) y ∈ Pi(xi) implies p(y) > p(xi), and
(c) for each (α1, . . . , αm) ∈ R
m
+ we have p
(∑m
i=1 αiωi
)
≤
∑m
i=1 αip(xi).
(3) A personalized equilibrium (resp. a personalized valuation equilibrium),
whenever it is an equilibrium (resp. a valuation equilibrium) with respect to some
supporting price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi with fi ∈ L
′
+ for each i that satisfies
p(ω) =
∑m
i=1 fi(xi).
(4) A Walrasian equilibrium (resp. a Walrasian valuation equilibrium), if
it is an equilibrium (resp. a valuation equilibrium) with an additive supporting
price in P.
Notice that condition (b) of part (1) of the above definition is equivalent to:
p(ω) =
m∑
i=1
p(xi) > 0.
In view of Lemma 7 it is easy to see that our definition of a Walrasian equilibrium
coincides with the standard definition in the literature. The following theorem, es-
tablished in [13, Theorems 5.1 and 7.5 & Lemma 6.3], is the basic result in the
literature regarding the decentralization of efficient allocations by non-linear prices.
Theorem 16 (Aliprantis–Tourky–Yannelis) For a proper economy the follow-
ing hold true:
(1) An allocation is weakly Pareto optimal if and only if it is a valuation equilibrium.
Edgeworth equilibria exist in compact economies.
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(2) An allocation is an Edgeworth equilibrium if and only if it is an equilibrium.
(3) Every equilibrium is a personalized equilibrium and every valuation equilibrium
is a personalized valuation equilibrium.
(4) If the economy is compact, then there exists an equilibrium.
We also have the following companion to Theorem 16 that was obtained in [9].
Theorem 17 There exists a compact proper economy in which an equilibrium with a
non-linear price exists but no Walrasian equilibrium with (continuous or discontinuous)
linear prices exists, and Pareto optimal allocations that are supported as equilibria
by non-linear prices but not as Walrasian valuation equilibria with linear prices.
4 Linear Decentralization
In this section we look at sufficient conditions on the order structure of the space
that will guarantee the supportability of optimal allocations by linear prices. But
first, let us recall some notions of properness for functions on L+.
Definition 18 We say that a function f : L+ → R is:
(1) ω-proper at some y ∈ L+, if there exists a convex set F such that:
(a) y + ω is an interior point of F , and
(b) F ∩ L+ = {z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(y)}.
(2) Pointwise proper at ω, if there exists an open wedge 5 Γ such that:
(a) (ω − Γ) ∩ L+ 6= 6©, and
(b) (ω − Γ) ∩
{
x ∈ L+ : f(x) > f(ω)
}
= 6©.
Some basic properties of the preceding notions of properness are included in the
next result.
Lemma 19 For a function f : L+ → R we have the following.
(1) If there exists a price pi ∈ L′+ that supports the set
{
z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(ω)
}
at
ω (i.e., z ∈ L+ with f(z) > f(ω) implies pi(z) ≥ pi(ω)) and satisfies pi(ω) > 0,
5 An open wedge Γ is any nonempty open convex set such that αx ∈ Γ for any α > 0
and x ∈ Γ.
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then f is pointwise proper at ω.
(2) A price p ∈ P that satisfies p(ω) > 0 is pointwise proper at ω if and only if
there exists some price pi ∈ L′+ such that:
(a) pi(ω) = p(ω),
(b) pi ≥ p, and
(c) pi supports the convex set
{
z ∈ L+ : p(z) ≥ p(ω)
}
at ω.
(3) If f is ω-proper at ω, then f is pointwise proper at ω.
proof. (1) Assume that the set
{
z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(ω)
}
is supported at ω by a price
pi ∈ L′+ that satisfies pi(ω) > 0. Now consider the open wedge Γ = {x ∈ L : pi(x) >
0} and note that ω− 1
2
ω ∈ (ω−Γ)∩L+ and that if some γ ∈ Γ satisfies ω− γ ∈ L+
and f(ω−γ) > f(ω), then pi(ω) ≤ pi(ω−γ) or pi(γ) ≤ 0, which is impossible. Hence,
(ω − Γ) ∩ {x ∈ L+ : f(x) > f(ω)} = 6©, and thus f is pointwise proper at ω.
(2) Assume that Γ is an open wedge such that (ω−Γ)∩{z ∈ L+ : p(z) > p(ω)} = 6©
and (ω−Γ)∩L+ 6= 6©. By the separation theorem there exists some non-zero pi ∈ L
′
such that pi(ω − γ) ≤ pi(z) holds for all γ ∈ Γ and all z ∈ L+ with p(z) > p(ω).
From p(δω) > p(ω) for all δ > 1 we get pi(ω− γ) ≤ δpi(ω) for all δ > 1. This implies
pi(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ Γ, and consequently pi(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ Γ. 6
To see that pi ≥ 0 holds fix z ∈ L+ and note that for each real number δ > 1 we have
p(δω + z) > p(ω). This implies pi(ω − γ) ≤ δpi(ω) + pi(z) for all δ > 1 and all γ ∈ Γ,
and from this it follows that pi(z) ≥ 0, i.e., pi ≥ 0. Next, pick some γ1 ∈ Γ with
ω − γ1 ∈ L+ and note that 0 ≤ pi(ω − γ1) < pi(ω). Moreover, since p is concave, it
should be clear that pi supports the set
{
z ∈ L+ : p(z) ≥ p(ω)
}
at ω. If we replace
pi by p(ω)
pi(ω)
pi we have pi(ω) = p(ω). The fact that pi ≥ p follows immediately from
Lemma 12. The converse follows immediately from part (1).
(3) Assume that f is ω-proper at ω. Pick a convex set F such that 2ω in an interior
point of F and F∩L+ = {z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(ω)}. Since ω /∈ {z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(ω)},
it follows that ω /∈ F . So, by the separation theorem, there exists some non-zero
pi ∈ L′ such that pi(ω) ≤ pi(x) for all x ∈ F . Since 2ω is an interior point of F , it
follows that pi(ω) > 0. Now notice that pi supports the set
{
z ∈ L+ : f(z) > f(ω)
}
6 If pi(γ0) = 0 holds for some γ0 ∈ Γ, then pick some circled neighborhood V of zero with
γ0 + V ⊆ Γ and note that pi(γ0 + v) ≥ 0 implies pi(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ V . The latter shows
that pi = 0, which is a contradiction.
19
at ω and use part (1).
We also have the following useful characterization of pointwise proper prices.
Lemma 20 If order intervals of L are weakly compact, then for a price p of the
form p =
∨m
i=1 fi such that p(ω) > 0 the following statements are equivalent:
(1) The price p is pointwise proper at ω.
(2) There exists a solution to the following linear minimization problem:
min g(ω) subject to: g ∈ L′ and g ≥ fi for all i = 1, . . . ,m. (S)
proof. (1) =⇒ (2) If p =
∨m
i=1 fi is pointwise proper at ω, then (according to part (2)
of Lemma 19) there is some pi ∈ L′+ with pi ≥ p and pi(ω) = p(ω). Clearly, pi ≥ fi
for all i and pi is a solution to the minimization problem (S).
(2) =⇒ (1) Let p =
∨m
i=1 fi. Let pi be a solution to the minimization problem (S).
From [10, Theorem 7.6] it follows that p(ω) = pi(ω) > 0. From the fact that pi ≥ fi
for each i we see that pi ≥ p and (by Lemma 12) pi supports the convex set {y ∈
L+ : p(y) > p(ω)} at ω. By part (1) of Lemma 19, p is pointwise proper at ω.
In the next result we show how pointwise properness of non-linear prices can guar-
antee decentralization by linear prices.
Lemma 21 We have the following:
(1) A valuation equilibrium supported by a price that is pointwise proper at ω is a
Walrasian valuation equilibrium.
(2) An equilibrium supported by a price that is ω-proper at ω is a Walrasian equi-
librium.
(3) If the initial endowments are decomposable, then any equilibrium supported by
a price that is pointwise proper at ω is a Walrasian equilibrium.
proof. (1) Let (x1, . . . , xm) be a valuation equilibrium that is supported by a price
p ∈ P which is pointwise proper at ω. We can assume that p(ω) = 1. By part (2) of
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Lemma 19 there exists some pi ∈ L′+ satisfying pi(ω) = p(ω) = 1 that supports the
set {z ∈ L′+ : p(z) ≥ p(ω)} at ω and pi ≥ p. Now the relation
1 = pi(ω) =
m∑
i=1
pi(xi) ≥
m∑
i=1
p(xi) = p(ω) = 1
implies that pi(xi) = p(xi) for each i. It is now easy to see that pi supports the
allocation as a Walrasian valuation equilibrium.
(2) Let (x1, . . . , xm) be an equilibrium with a supporting price p ∈ P satisfying
p(ω) = 1. Since preferences are strictly monotone and αxi ∈ Pi(xi) holds for each
α > 1 it follows that p(αxi) = αp(xi) > p(xi). This implies that p(xi) > 0 for each
i.
Now consider the collection of bundles
X =
{
ω1
p(x1)
, . . . , ωm
p(xm)
}
.
Since
∑m
i=1 p(xi) = p(ω) = 1, it is easy to see that ω ∈ coX. Also, from condition
(c) of the definition of an equilibrium, it follows that
coX ∩ {z ∈ L+ : p(z) > 1} = 6© .
From the ω-properness of p we see that there exists some convex set F that contains
2ω in its interior such that F ∩L+ = {z ∈ L+ : p(z) > 1}. Therefore, coX ∩F = 6©.
Let pi be a non-zero continuous linear functional that separates these two sets, i.e.,
pi(x) ≤ pi(z) holds for all x ∈ coX and all z ∈ F with p(z) > 1. Since ω ∈ coX
and 2ω is in the interior of F , we see that that pi(2ω) > pi(ω), which implies that
pi(ω) > 0. Therefore, we can assume that pi(ω) = 1.
Now if z ∈ L+ satisfies p(z) = p(ω) = 1, then δz ∈ F for all δ > 1 and therefore we
have p(ω) = pi(ω) ≤ δpi(z) for all δ > 1. This implies p(ω) ≤ pi(z), and consequently
from Lemma 12 it follows that pi ≥ p. Therefore, as in part (1), it must be the case
that pi supports the allocation as a Walrasian valuation equilibrium with pi(xi) =
p(xi) for each i. Furthermore, it should be clear that pi
(
ωi
p(xi)
)
≤ 1 and therefore,
pi(ωi) ≤ p(xi) = pi(xi). This implies pi(ωi) = pi(xi) and thus pi supports the allocation
as a Walrasian equilibrium.
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(3) Assume that
∑m
i=1Aωi = Aω and let (x1, . . . , xm) be an equilibrium. By part (3)
of Theorem 16 we know that (x1, . . . , xm) is a personalized equilibrium. Let p =∨m
i=1 fi be a personalized price supporting (x1, . . . , xm) with p(ω) = 1. We know
that
p(ω) = sup
{ m∑
i=1
fi(y) : y ∈ Aω
}
.
Now from the decomposability assumption, it follows that
∑m
i=1 p(ωi) = p(ω) . In
particular, p(xi) = p(ωi) for each i. Now as in (1) we can find some pi ∈ L
′
+ with
pi(ω) = 1 and pi ≥ p. As above pi(xi) = p(xi) and pi(ωi) = p(ωi), which clearly
implies that pi is the desired supporting linear price.
We continue by introducing the notion of a proper price space.
Definition 22 We shall say that the price space P is:
(1) ω-proper, if each price p ∈ P satisfying p(ω) > 0 is ω-proper at ω, and
(2) pointwise proper at ω, if each price p ∈ P satisfying p(ω) > 0 is pointwise
proper at ω.
From Lemma 19 we know that an ω-proper price space P is automatically pointwise
proper at ω. We can now turn to the first of our major results. Remarkably, as
expected from the previous discussion, when the price space is proper we regain
the classical Walrasian value theory with linear prices even outside of the realm of
vector lattice commodity spaces.
Theorem 23 For an ω-proper price space we have the following:
(1) The notions of equilibrium, Walrasian equilibrium, and Edgeworth equilibrium
coincide.
(2) If the economy is compact, then there exists a Walrasian equilibrium.
proof. The validity of the statements follows immediately from Lemma 21 in con-
junction with Theorem 16.
There are many interesting examples of price spaces that are ω-proper for which the
commodity space is not a Riesz space and lacks the Riesz decomposition property.
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Moreover, the properness of the price space depends on the position of ω in L+. One
can construct even finite dimensional examples in which the price space is proper
for some positive vectors but not for others.
We conclude this section with an analogue of the preceding theorem for pointwise
proper price spaces. Its proof is similar and is omitted.
Theorem 24 For a price space that is pointwise proper at ω we have the following:
(1) The notions of valuation equilibrium, Walrasian valuation equilibrium, and
weak Pareto optimality coincide.
(2) If the initial endowments are decomposable, then the notions of equilibrium,
Walrasian equilibrium, and Edgeworth equilibrium coincide.
(3) If the economy is compact and the initial endowments are decomposable, then
there exists a Walrasian equilibrium.
5 The indispensability of proper price spaces
We have seen that the properness of prices provides sufficient conditions for the
decentralization of optimal allocations by linear prices. In this section we show that
basically the properness of the non-linear prices also affords necessary conditions
for linear decentralization. That is, one cannot hope to derive the classical Wal-
rasian theory of value for proper economies unless the prices have some properness
properties at the total endowment vector. We begin with a definition.
Definition 25 For a price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi with fi ∈ L
′
+ for each i, we say
that an allocation x ∈ Aω is an optimizer if p(ω) =
∑m
i=1 fi(xi). The allocation x
is a non-trivial optimizer if p(ω) > 0 and xi > 0 for all i.
We are ready to establish the equivalence between pointwise proper price spaces and
the decentralization of Edgeworth equilibria by linear prices.
Theorem 26 For the collection ED(L, ω) of decomposable economies the following
statements are equivalent:
(a) Each price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi that has a non-trivial optimizer is pointwise
proper at ω.
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(b) Every Edgeworth equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium.
proof.
(a) =⇒ (b) Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) be an Edgeworth equilibrium for some economy
in ED(L, ω). Clearly, x is a non-trivial allocation. According to Theorem 16, the
allocation x is an equilibrium for some price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi with p(ω) > 0
for which x is an optimizer.
Now, by our assumption, p is pointwise proper at ω and a glance at part (3) of
Lemma 21 guarantees that x is a Walrasian equilibrium.
(b) =⇒ (a) Let a price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi with p(ω) > 0 have a non-trivial
optimizer x = (x1, . . . , xm). That is, xi > 0 for all i and p(ω) =
∑m
i=1 fi(xi).
Fix a strictly positive linear functional h on L and put gi = fi + h for each i and
consider the price q =
∨m
i=1 gi = p+ h. We claim that q is pointwise proper at ω.
Clearly, x = (x1, . . . , xm) is an optimizer for q. That is, q(ω) =
∑m
i=1 gi(xi) > 0.
From q(xi) ≥ gi(xi) and the inequalities
q(ω) = q
( m∑
i=1
xi
)
≥
m∑
i=1
q(xi) ≥
m∑
i=1
gi(xi) = q(ω) ,
it follows that gi(xi) = q(xi) holds for all i.
Next, we shall define an economy in ED(L, ω) for which x is an Edgeworth equilib-
rium. To this end, for each i let ωi =
gi(xi)
q(ω)
ω > 0 and note that q(ωi) = gi(xi) holds
for each i. Furthermore, for each trader i = 1, . . . ,m let gi be the trader’s utility
function. Clearly, this economy is in ED(L, ω).
Since x ∈ L+ with gi(x) > gi(xi) implies q(x) ≥ gi(x) > gi(xi) = q(xi), it follows
that q supports x as a valuation equilibrium. We need to show that q supports x as
an equilibrium. To this end, let α1, . . . , αm be arbitrary non-negative scalars. Then
we have
m∑
i=1
αiq(xi) =
m∑
i=1
αigi(xi) =
m∑
i=1
αiq(ωi) = q
( m∑
i=1
αiωi
)
,
which tells us that x is an equilibrium and thus an Edgeworth equilibrium.
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Therefore, by assumption x is a Walrasian equilibrium for some non-zero price pi ∈
L′+, which is clearly strictly positive. We can assume without loss of generality that
pi(ω) = q(ω). Clearly, pi(xi) = pi(ωi) = gi(xi). By Lemma 12 it must be the case that
pi ≥ gi for each i and thus pi ≥ q.
Finally, notice that from the inequality pi ≥ q = p + h we get pi − h ≥ p > 0.
Moreover, from (pi − h)(ω) = (q − h)(ω) = p(ω) > 0 and the fact that if y ∈ L+
satisfies p(y) > p(ω), then (pi − h)(y) ≥ q(y) − h(y) = p(y) > p(ω) = (pi − h)(ω),
it follows that pi − h supports the set {y ∈ L+ : p(y) > p(ω} at ω. Therefore, by
part (1) of Lemma 19, we see that p is pointwise proper at ω.
Let us move on to the second welfare theorem. We begin by introducing one more
notion of pointwise properness for prices.
Definition 27 We say that a price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi is ω-scalable at x ∈ Aω
if there exist multipliers λ1, . . . , λm satisfying 0 < λi ≤ 1 for each i such that:
(1) the allocation x is an optimizer for the new price q =
∨m
i=1 λifi, and
(2) the price q is pointwise proper at ω.
Now we can state and prove the main result of this section. It presents necessary
and sufficient conditions for the Walrasian decentralization of optimal allocations.
Theorem 28 In the set of proper economies E(L, ω) the following statements are
equivalent:
(a) Every price of the form p =
∨m
i=1 fi with each fi strictly positive is ω-scalable
at each of its non-trivial optimizers.
(b) Every non-trivial Pareto optimal allocation is a Walrasian valuation equilib-
rium.
proof. (a) =⇒ (b) Let x = (x1, . . . , xm) be a non-trivial Pareto optimal allocation
for some economy in E(L, ω). From parts (1) and (3) of Theorem 16 this allocation
is supported as a valuation equilibrium by a price p =
∨m
i=1 fi for which x is an
optimizer. So, we have p(ω) =
∑m
i=1 pi(xi) =
∑m
i=1 fi(xi). Since p(xi) ≥ fi(xi) for
each i, it follows that p(xi) = fi(xi) for each i. Furthermore, the proof of [13,
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Theorem 5.1 (1)] shows that the functions fi can be chosen in such a way that each
fi (strictly) supports Pi(xi) at xi, i.e., y ∈ Pi(xi) implies fi(y) > fi(xi).
We need to show that each fi is strictly positive. From p(ω) =
∑m
i=1 fi(xi) > 0
it must be the case that fj(xj) > 0 for some j. Notice that if z ∈ Pj(xj) and
fj(z) = fj(xj), then fj(αz) < fj(xj) for all α < 1; which is impossible since Pj has
open values in some linear topology on L. Therefore, for z > 0, it must be the case
that fj(xj + z) > fj(xj), which implies that fj(z) > 0. This in turn implies that fj
and p are strictly positive, which further implies that fi(xi) = p(xi) > 0 for each i.
By the same argument we see that each fi is strictly positive.
Now by our assumption there exist scalars λ1, . . . , λm with 0 < λi ≤ 1 for each i
such that x remains an optimizer of the price q =
∨m
i=1 λifi that is pointwise proper
at the point ω.
Next, we shall show that q also supports the allocation x as a valuation equilibrium.
Clearly, q(xi) ≥ λifi(xi) for each i and since x is an optimizer for q we have
q(ω) =
m∑
i=1
λifi(xi) ≤
m∑
i=1
q(xi) ≤ q(ω) .
Consequently, for each i we have q(xi) = λifi(xi) and
∑m
i=1 q(xi) = q(ω) > 0. Now if
z ∈ Pi(xi), then q(z) ≥ λifi(z) > λifi(xi) = q(xi), and this shows that q supports x
as a valuation equilibrium. Now the validity of (b) follows from part (1) of Lemma 21.
(b) =⇒ (a) Assume that (b) is true and let an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xm) be a
non-trivial optimizer for a price p =
∨m
i=1 fi with each fi strictly positive.
Next, we consider an economy with m consumers, total endowment ω, and utility
functions given by the strictly positive linear functionals fi. Thus, the preference
correspondence Pi : L+→→L+ of consumer i is defined by Pi(y) = {x ∈ L+ : fi(x) >
fi(y)}. Clearly, this economy is ω-proper and since x is an optimizer it is Pareto
optimal. So, according to our hypothesis, there exists a non-zero price pi ∈ L′+ that
supports x as a valuation equilibrium. That is, if z ∈ L+ satisfies fi(z) > fi(xi),
then pi(z) > pi(xi). By the strict positivity of fi we see that fi(2xi) > fi(xi) and so
2pi(xi) > pi(xi). Consequently, pi(xi) > 0 holds for each i. Without loss of generality
we can assume that 0 < pi(xi) < fi(xi) also holds for each i.
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Now for each i let λi =
pi(xi)
fi(xi)
and note that 0 < λi < 1. For each i consider the
strictly positive linear functional gi = λifi. Observe that gi(xi) = pi(xi) for each i.
Moreover, if some vector z ∈ L+ satisfies gi(z) = gi(xi) > 0, or fi(z) = fi(xi), then
fi(δz) > fi(xi) for all δ > 1 and so δpi(z) > pi(xi) for all δ > 1, from which it follows
that pi(z) ≥ pi(xi) = gi(xi). Now a glance at Lemma 12 guarantees that pi ≥ gi for
each i. This implies pi ≥
∨m
i=1 gi, and so from
pi(ω) ≥
[ m∨
i=1
gi
]
(ω) ≥
m∑
i=1
gi(xi) =
m∑
i=1
pi(xi) = pi(ω) ,
we see that (x1, . . . , xm) is an optimizer for
∨m
i=1 gi and that pi(ω) =
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(ω) > 0.
Now if an arbitrary vector z ∈ L+ satisfies
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(z) >
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(ω), then we
have the inequalities pi(z) ≥
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(z) >
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(ω) = pi(ω). This shows that
pi supports the set
{
z ∈ L+ :
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(z) >
[∨m
i=1 gi
]
(ω)
}
at ω and from this and
part (a) of Lemma 19, we see that the price
∨m
i=1 gi is pointwise proper at ω.
We conclude this section by showing that the existence of an equilibrium implies
that prices are ω-scalable at each of their non-trivial optimizers.
Theorem 29 If for each economy in E(L, ω) there exists a Walrasian equilibrium,
then every price p =
∨m
i=1 fi with each fi strictly positive is ω-scalable at each of its
non-trivial optimizers.
proof. Let an allocation x = (x1, . . . , xm) be a non-trivial optimizer for a price
p =
∨m
i=1 fi with each fi strictly positive. Consider an economy with m consumers,
initial endowments ωi = xi for each i, and utility functions given by the strictly
positive linear functionals fi. Clearly, this economy is ω-proper.
According to our hypothesis, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium y = (y1, . . . , ym)
for this economy supported by non-zero price pi ∈ L′+. Since y is individually rational
and since x is an optimizer for the price p and fi(yi) ≥ fi(ωi) = fi(xi) holds for each
i it must be the case that fi(yi) = fi(xi) for each i. Since pi(yi) = pi(ωi) = pi(xi) for
each i, we see that if z ∈ L+ satisfies fi(z) > fi(xi), then pi(z) > pi(xi). It is now
easy to follow the proof of Theorem 28 and show that p is ω-scalable at x.
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6 Properness of prices in financial models
The previous theorems demonstrate that we need some pointwise properness of
prices if we are to derive the Walrasian value theory. We start with an example that
guarantees the ω-properness of prices in P .
Recall that in our model of portfolio trading we have two spaces linked by the
portfolio returns operator as follows:
(1) The portfolio space L is ordered by the portfolio dominance ordering.
(2) The space of contingent claims X is a Banach lattice.
(3) The portfolio returns operator R : L ↪→ X is one-to-one and positive and pulls
back order intervals of the marketed spaceM to closed and bounded dominance
intervals of L.
Here is an example of our finance model with an ω-proper price space.
Example 1 Let L = `2 and X = L2[0, 1] and consider the operator R : L → X
defined on the basic vectors e1, e2, . . . of `2 by
(1) R(e1) = χ[ 1
2
,1]
+ χ
[
1
5
,
1
3
]
,
(2) R(e2) = χ[ 1
3
,1]
,
(3) R(e3) = χ[ 1
4
,
1
2
]
, and
(4) R(en) = λnχ[ 1
n+2
,
1
n+1
]
for each n ≥ 4, where the scalars λn satisfy λn > 0 and
they are appropriately chosen so that R is indeed an operator from `2 to L2[0, 1].
As usual, if (α1, α2, . . .) ∈ `2, then we have
R(α1, α2, . . .) =
∞∑
n=1
αnR(en) .
Clearly, the operator R is one-to-one and positive (and hence continuous).
It should not be difficult to see that if λn = 1 for each n ≥ 4, then the operator R is
not bounded below. On the other hand if λn =
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 2) for each n ≥ 4, then
the operator R is bounded below. In fact, it is easy to verify that when λn = 1 for
each n ≥ 4 the operator R satisfies the following properties:
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(a) As in every model, the portfolio dominance cone on `2 is closed and generating.
Moreover, R pulls back order intervals of M to closed and bounded dominance
intervals in L.
(b) The portfolio dominance ordering on L is not a lattice ordering.
(c) The price space P is ω-proper for every positive portfolio ω ∈ L+.
Therefore our results on linear decentralization apply to this example.
Let M′ be the dual space of the marketed space M and assume that R is bounded
below. Then considering R : L→M as an order isomorphism, we see that its adjoint
R′ : M′ → L′, defined via the duality identity
〈R′(f),m〉 = 〈f,R(m)〉 = f
(
R(m)
)
for allm ∈M and all f ∈M′, is also an order isomorphism. This operator associates
each state dependent price system with a securities price. We call this operator the
securities prices operator.
We conclude the paper with the following very useful characterization of pointwise
proper prices in terms of a solution to a linear minimization problem. Its proof
follows immediately from Lemma 20.
Theorem 30 Assume that order intervals of L are weakly compact and that the
payoff operator R is bounded from below. Let f1, . . . , fm ∈ L
′
+ and ω > 0 be such
that the price p =
∨m
i=1 fi satisfies p(ω) > 0. Then the following three conditions are
equivalent:
(1) The price p is pointwise proper at ω.
(2) There exists a solution to the following linear minimization problem:
min g
(
R(ω)
)
subject to: g ∈M′ and R′(g) ≥ fi for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
(3) There exists a solution to the following linear minimization problem:
minh
(
R(ω)
)
subject to: h ∈ X ′ and R′(h) ≥ fi for all i = 1, . . . ,m,
where now R′ denotes the adjoint of the operator R : L→ X.
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